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Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T01003A002100050002-1

1 October 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR:

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ATTENTION :

FROM

: Chief, Publications Staff, ORR

SUBJECT

: Release of Information

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1. It is requested that information from the following sources in CIA/RR CB 64-59, Soviet Position in Afghanistan Enhanced by the Arrival of Advanced Weapons Systems, September 1964, SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM, be examined to determine whether or not there is any objection to the release of this information

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2. The information used for the chart following page 3 was taken from EIC-R14-S17, Aug 64, SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM. This chart and the reference to it on page 1 will be deleted before transmittal to the foreign governments.

3. If this information is approved for release to the above recipients, these sources will be deleted from the bibliography before the report is forwarded.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: C/Pub Staff/ORR

Approved.

INT/RC, 8 Oct 64

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Attachments:

Copies #207 & 208 of CB 64-59,

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Jm

41.5176
14 September 1964

Analysts: [REDACTED]

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I/PO, x7101

Coord: [REDACTED] I/A

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Approved: [REDACTED] Ch/I/PO, x7101;

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SOVIET POSITION IN AFGHANISTAN ENHANCED BY ARRIVAL
OF ADVANCED WEAPONRY

Recent evidence suggests that a new major arms agreement -- the first since 1959 -- [REDACTED] may

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have been signed by Afghanistan and the USSR.* Two types of Soviet missiles were observed in Kabul's Independence Day military parade on 23 August: the SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) and what is described as an anti-tank missile (probably the Snapper or Swatter SAM, a wire-guided tactical system). Moreover, purchase of a squadron of Mig-21 supersonic jet fighters and several AN-12 turboprop assault transports may follow. Although Afghanistan is now striving to adhere to a more "correctly neutral" foreign policy than recently, the delivery of such advanced weaponry presumably will further enhance the Soviet military presence in that country.

1. New Equipment

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[REDACTED] delivery of 12 SA-2 missiles and six antitank missiles from the USSR to Afghanistan was completed. Subsequently, this armament was featured in Kabul's Independence Day military parade where it elicited general surprise from the foreign representatives

* See graphic for list of military aid agreements between Communist countries and Afghanistan.

present.^{2/} This public display of a "prestige" item probably was designed to serve a dual purpose: (1) to influence Afghan governmental and military figures during the period prior to approving the new Constitution, and (2) to project a hardier military image to those foreign representatives viewing the parade. These missiles probably were purchased by the military mission led by Defense Minister Khan Mohammed Khan which traveled to Moscow in late June. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] In particular, it appears likely that Kabul will purchase a squadron (probably 10-16 aircraft) of Mig-21 jet fighters^{3/} as well as four or five An-12 assault transports.*^{4/} Officer trainees were being selected in March 1964 to go to the USSR for training in Mig-19 and Mig-21 aircraft.^{5/} Although the Mig-19 probably figured in Kabul's earlier plans, the dissatisfaction of other Free World recipients with the plane probably is known to the Afghans and it is doubtful that any will be purchased. The aircraft portion alone of the new agreement, if included, could possibly be valued at more than \$20 million at list prices.

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* The delivery of Mig-21's to Afghanistan has been rumored for the past two years, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] An earlier report stated that the USSR would provide two squadrons of Mig-21's and one squadron of Mig-19's, first deliveries to be in May 1964. Obviously such numbers are beyond Kabul's needs, as well as operational capabilities and, if ever considered, have been pared. An Il-18 turboprop passenger transport has been mentioned as a possible purchase, but this would have no military application.

2. Tactical Implications

Afghanistan is the fifth Free World country to be furnished SAM's by the USSR.* An analogy with other recipients permits an estimate of the eventual size of Afghanistan's program. To defend Kabul, at least three SAM firing battalions and one technical support battalion would be required. This program is valued on the order of \$10 million. Construction and training requirements will push an operational readiness date two or more years into the future. No estimate is possible on the size of the Snapper or Swatter inventory: The ERDM amphibious combat reconnaissance vehicle is the launcher used for the missiles and to date Kabul has not received any of these vehicles. Purely in terms of equipment, the Mig-21 fighters would prove an enormous performance step-up from the obsolete Mig-15's and Mig-17's currently comprising the air force. Likewise, a serious air transport deficiency would be ameliorated by the acquisition of the An-12 assault transports. Overall, the new acquisitions would eventually boost the Afghan air defense capability immeasurably. When operational, they probably would discourage in some degree the alleged intrusions of Afghan air space by Pakistani aircraft. Because of the general ineptitude of the air force, however, this enhanced air defense capability probably will not be realized within the next two years.

* The UAR, Indonesia, India, and Iraq have received this advanced weaponry. Recently, Iraq cancelled its SAM program and transferred the equipment already delivered to the UAR.

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3. Other Implications

Although the present Afghan government appears to be striving toward a more correct form of neutrality than the former Soviet-leaning regime under Premier Daud, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan continues to be firmly established.^{6/} The Afghan armed forces have been reorganized, largely through advice of the Soviet military aid mission which has been working on the problem since Marshal Sokolovsky's visit in October 1961.^{7/} In November 1963 the Ministry of National Defense opened an Army Staff college in Kabul organized and staffed entirely by Russians.^{8/} Although there is no evidence that the Soviets are in any better position to exert leverage on the governmental elite than they have been since the inception of military aid in 1956, their potential for influence appears to be demonstrably increasing. Additional Russian technicians will be required to train indigenous personnel in Afghanistan and more Afghan trainees will probably be sent to the USSR for instruction, in addition to the large number already there.^{9/}

The purchase of this complex and expensive equipment, however, will pose problems for Kabul. The assimilation of the advanced weaponry will require a higher level of technical competence than has been demonstrated thus far. Furthermore, the limited skilled manpower available in the country will be increasingly strained by the establishment and operation of advanced weapons facilities. Finally, while the financial details of the new agreement are not yet known, any increase

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in indebtedness will generate additional difficulties for the Afghan Government in meeting its already large military and economic debt obligations to the USSR.

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Military Equipment Delivered by Communist Countries to Afghanistan
1956 to the Present

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Units</u>
Medium tank	220
Self-propelled assault gun	18
Personnel carrier	62
Artillery piece	600
Jet bomber	58
Jet fighter	125
Other aircraft	92

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List of Sources

ORR Project 41.5176

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- 1.
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- 3.
- 4.
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6. Embassy Kabul, Despatch 24, July 64 (S).
7. Embassy Kabul, IT 249, 14 Dec 62 (S).

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- 8.



9. EIC R14-S17, Aug 64 (S/NFD). *Sentinel version*
- 9a EIC-R14-S17, Aug 64, S/NFD *version*

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